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1. DG Competition,
accessible under
http://ec.europa.eu/compe-
tition/state_aid/scoreboard/f
inancial_economic_crisis_aid
_en.html.
2. Basel II introduced a
three-pillar framework: Pillar
1 defines minimum capital
requirements; Pillar 2 is a
bank-specific add-on after
supervisory review and
Pillar 3 concerns disclosure
requirements.
3. The EBA develops
regulatory technical
standards. They are submit-
ted to the European
Commission for endorse-
ment. The European Parlia-
ment and the Council may,
within a specified period of
time, object to any RTS
adopted by the Commis-
sion. If, on the expiry of the
objection period, neither the
European Parliament nor
the Council has objected to
the RTS, it is published in
the Official Journal of the
European Union and enters
into force on the date
stated therein.
1 intrOdUCtiOn
The financial and euro-area crises showed how
costly it can be for the public sector to take charge
of banking sector problems. Between 2007 and
2013, European Union governments provided
€836 billion to guarantee bank funding and €448
billion to recapitalise banks1. The Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) was introduced
to establish a new framework for resolving banks
with reduced involvement of taxpayers in bank
rescues. The backbone of the new approach is the
bail-in tool, which requires a greater share of the
cost of recapitalisation or resolution to be shifted
onto private creditors. For bail-in to be effective,
the BRRD foresees a minimum requirement for eli-
gible liabilities and own funds (MREL) that banks
need to comply with. Effective resolution of banks
is however a global priority, and the Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB) set in 2011 a global standard
for total loss absorption capacity (TLAC), applying
to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs),
which needs to be transposed into EU law. How
can the design of MREL be made consistent with
both TLAC and the requirements of the BRRD? The
two concepts have significant conceptual and
operational differences and there is a strong
rationale for harmonisation, to avoid creating con-
fusion and uncertainty. We briefly review the dif-
ferences and comment specifically on the choice
of the measure through which requirements are
expressed: risk-weighted assets or total assets.
2  Mrel and tlaC: tHe BaCkgrOUnd
Before embarking on the data analysis, it is useful
to briefly review the regulatory background to
MREL. Article 45 of the Bank Recovery and Reso-
lution Directive (BRRD) requires that banks hold
sufficient bail-in-able liabilities and meet at all
times a minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities (MREL). MREL is currently envis-
aged as a Pillar 2 measure2, ie not a minimum
standard but one set individually for each bank.
While the concept of MREL is defined in the BRRD,
its operational definition is left to the European
Banking Authority (EBA)3, which published Regu-
latory Technical Standards (RTS) on 3 July 2015.
These set out an MREL measure that combines a
loss-absorption amount and a recapitalisation
amount (Figure 1). The first component needs to
be sufficient to ensure that losses are absorbed.
The EBA argues that the regulatory capital require-
ments reflect the judgement of the supervisor
about the level of unexpected losses that an insti-
tution should be able to absorb, so as a baseline,
losses equal to capital requirements should be
absorbed. Combined buffer requirements fore-
seen in the Capital Requirements Directive
(CRDIV) could be added as could any existing
Pillar 2 requirements. The EBA RTS leave discretion
to the resolution authority to change these
requirements, subject to consultation with the
supervisor. In particular, MREL can be adjusted
based on the estimated contribution of the
Deposit Guarantee Scheme, or to reflect specific
features of the institutions, such as business
model risk profile or governance.
The second component is a recapitalisation
amount, which should ensure the institution is
able to re-enter the market. For those institutions
that can be liquidated credibly and safely, the EBA
argues that the recapitalisation amount should be
zero. If this is not the case, then the recapitalisa-
tion amount should at least enable institutions to
comply with the minimum criteria required to
obtain the supervisor’s authorisation to operate,
so an 8 percent total capital ratio. However, the
resolution authority can increase this, if deemed
necessary to “maintain sufficient market confi-
dence after resolution” (EBA, 2016).
For systemically important institutions – which
are unlikely to be easily liquidated or resolved
without the use of external funds – the draft RTS
require the resolution authority to confirm, as part
of its assessment of MREL, that the bank’s
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resolution plan is compatible with the ‘burden
sharing’ clause of the BRRD (Article 44(5)), which
prescribes a bail-in amount of 8 percent of total
liabilities before any external funds can be
accessed. The European Commission would like
to see this removed from the RTS, on the grounds
that it might be seen as introducing a general min-
imum MREL for systemically important banks. The
EBA opposed this amendment, arguing that the 8
percent burden-sharing should be taken into
account because it represents a significant con-
straint on the resolution authority when setting
MRELs for these banks (EBA, 2016).
The MREL framework is legally binding for all
banks domiciled in the EU, but the effort to ensure
the resolvability of financial institutions is global.
The FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) agreed in November 2015 on
a global standard for total loss absorption capac-
ity (TLAC), which applies only to the global sys-
tematically important banks (G-SIBs). These are
the world’s 30 largest banks, 13 of which are cur-
rently in the EU jurisdiction (Figure 2).
Different to MREL, TLAC is a Pillar 1 requirement
that sets a minimum standard for all G-SIBs. The
FSB requires G-SIBs to hold mandatory minimum
TLAC levels equivalent to 16 percent of risk-
weighted assets subject to a minimum of 6 per-
cent of total leverage exposure. The requirements
will take effect from 2019, and will rise to 18 per-
cent and 6.75 percent respectively in 2022. In
terms of composition, TLAC may include, in addi-
tion to regulatory capital, subordinated or unse-
cured senior debt, which must be at least 33
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For 
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figure 1: Mrel according to eBa rtS
Source: Bruegel, based on EBA RTS.
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figure 2: total loss absorption capacity (tlaC)
Source: Bruegel, based on FSB (2015).
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4. See Appendix C for more
details on capital ratios and
capital buffers.
percent of the total TLAC amount4. Basel III buffers
(like the capital conservation buffer or the G-SIB
buffer) are not included and must be covered by
are not included and must be covered by addi-
tional CET1 capital. The FSB also defines the con-
cept of ‘internal TLAC’, which we discuss in the
next section.
3 differenCeS and inCOnSiStenCieS
Both TLAC and MREL seek to ensure that banks
hold enough liabilities with loss-absorbing capac-
ity to deal with banking crises, protecting financial
stability and minimising costs for taxpayers, but
there are important differences. TLAC was con-
ceived as a Pillar 1 measure and it applies only to
G-SIBs but it constitutes a common minimum
standard; MREL on the contrary is a Pillar 2 meas-
ure, it applies to all European banks but it is mostly
determined on a case-by-case basis, with discre-
tion left to the resolution authority.
TLAC is not legally binding in itself but in order to
ensure compliant implementation for EU-domi-
ciled G-SIBs it will require amendments to the cur-
rently relevant EU legislation (CRR/CRD IV, BRRD).
MREL requirements for individual EU banks could
vary significantly, because of the scope for dis-
cretion we have described: MREL could be above
16 percent or as low as 8 percent of risk-weighted
assets for a non-systemic bank, should the reso-
lution authority waive additional requirements
and the recapitalisation amount.
Another technical aspect that should be clarified is
the level of consolidation at which the authorities
will ask banks to comply with MREL. In a single
point of entry approach, resolution tools are
applied at the level of the holding company,
whereas in a multiple points of entry approach
they are applied at different levels within the
group. The difference between the two approaches
is relevant in the context of the MREL/TLAC dis-
cussion. In a single point of entry resolution strat-
egy, losses incurred within the group are absorbed
by the ultimate parent or holding company. There-
fore, loss-absorption capacity in this case should
be created at parent level and transferred to each
subsidiary internally. This internal capacity should
ensure that if the home resolution authority (ie the
one responsible for the parent company) triggers
bail-in at the parent-company level, the loss-
making subsidiaries can be recapitalised. In a mul-
tiple points of entry strategy, on the contrary,
resolution and resolution tools operate independ-
ently at the level of individual subsidiaries. This
implies that within the group, each entity that
might be subject to a separate resolution action
and should have sufficient individual loss absorp-
tion capacity should cover its own losses in case
of resolution. 
TLAC favours a single point of entry approach. To
ensure that capital can be made available at the
parent-company level in the event of resolution,
TLAC includes a requirement for significant sub-
groups to maintain a level of ‘internal TLAC’
amounting to at least 75-90 percent of what the
sub-group would have to provide should it be
resolved individually. MREL on the contrary does
not favour one specific approach, but allows for a
case-by-case assessment of each group based on
the proposed resolution plan. However, MREL is
meant to create extra loss-absorbing capacity, ie
to shift losses to external shareholders and bond-
holders. This seems to imply that MREL should in
principle be applied at the consolidated level,
where there are external share and bond holders,
and not at the individual internal level.
There is also confusion on how the requirements
should be calculated in practice. While TLAC is
framed in terms of risk-weighted assets and lever-
age exposure, in Europe the measure of total
(unweighted) assets has come back into the dis-
cussion, because of the role that it plays in the
BRRD burden-sharing framework. We will show in
the next section that the choice of measure is
relevant for the distribution of requirements
across banks. 
It should be evident that the coexistence of two
standards that differ in several ways is potentially
confusing, not only for banks that will need to
comply with both, but also for investors and credit
rating agencies. There is certainly a strong case for
avoiding the creation of double standards, and the
implementation of the TLAC standard in EU law and
the review of MREL requirements as foreseen in
article 45 of the BRRD might provide an opportu-
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nity to amend the definition of MREL, and align it
with both the TLAC standard and the actual method-
ology used to calculate MREL requirements. 
4  wHat dOeS tHe data tell US?
In this section, we address two questions. First,
we look at whether the choice of the denominator,
ie the measure against which requirements are
benchmarked, matters for the allocation of
requirements to banks, and if so, how. Second, we
look at how different metrics impact potential loss
absorption amounts. This also sheds some light
on the question of the potential alignment of MREL
and TLAC.
The analysis is based on a sample of 105 banking
groups that were assessed in the 2015 EBA trans-
parency exercise, covering about 70 percent of
the EU’s banking assets. We use the most recent
data available after combining data from EBA and
SNL Financial, which means mid-2015 data for
most of the banks, otherwise end-2014 or
end-2015 (see Appendix A for more details).
4.1  The choice of the metric
Many regulatory measures that play a key role in
banking supervision are expressed in terms of a
banks’ risk-weighted assets. The use of risk-
weighted assets in banking supervision has been
criticised on several counts. Le Leslé and
Avramova (2012) for example highlight the pro-
cyclicality of this metric, and the incentive for
banks to game the system by underestimating
risks. The measure of leverage introduced by
Basel III is non risk based and is intended to com-
plement the risk-weighted requirement, as lever-
age ratios are simpler to compute and they tend
to be more countercyclical than risk-weighted
assets (Brei and Gambacorta, 2014). Leverage
ratios are also expected to give a more complete
and harmonised picture of a bank’s total exposure,
encompassing on- and off-balance sheet items.
In Europe, total assets are once again being seen
as relevant for regulatory ratios, because the
BRRD’s minimum bail-in requirement, which
needs to be met in a bank resolution before exter-
nal funds can be accessed, is expressed as per-
centage of total liabilities. It is therefore useful to
understand the differences between the three
metrics in practice.
Figure 3 shows the ratio of risk-weighted assets to
banks’ total assets and demonstrates that there
are major differences according to bank size, with
smaller banks having a higher ratio and larger
banks smaller ratios. This implies that any meas-
ure based on risk-weighted rather than total
assets will lead to relatively higher requirements
for small banks. For completeness, we also show
the ratio of leverage exposures to total assets
(Figure B1 in Appendix B). Total assets and lever-
age exposures unsurprisingly appear significantly
more aligned across banks, independent of bank
size. However, the dispersion across banks can
still be sizeable, ranging from 77.7 percent to
125.5 percent in the whole sample5.
For 12 G-SIBs headquartered in the EU6, Figure 4
shows the amounts of risk-weighted and total
assets, ie total liabilities including own funds7. It
emerges that even within the same bank size
bracket, the ratios of total and risk-weighted
assets are quite different, ranging from 21.9 per-
cent to 46.4 percent. As an example, if risk-
weighted assets were used as the underlying
metric, Banco Santander would face higher
requirements than Société Générale, even though
both have similar sized balance sheets.
34 32.9
42.5
62.4
0
20
40
60
G-SIB L M S
figure 3: risk-weighted assets to total assets
ratio by bank size category
Source: Bruegel calculations based on EBA Data and SNL
Financial. Note: The amounts shown are averages across
size groups weighted by total assets. The size groups are
categorised according to total assets: smaller than €30
billion (S), between €30 billion and €150 billion (M), and
larger than €150 billion (L). G-SIBs are excluded from these
three groups and deﬁned in FSB (2015).
5. Excluding SNS REAAL
as an outlier with 180.7
percent.
6. The thirteenth European
GSIB, Standard Chartered, is
not in the EBA dataset.
We therefore exclude it from
our calculations.
7. For completeness, we
also show in Appendix B the
ratios of risk-weighted to
total assets and risk-
weighted assets to leverage
exposures for these banks.
8.Le Leslé and Avramova
(2012) show that the differ-
ences might also be driven
by internal factors such as
the banks’ business mix, by
provision practices or by
external factors such as
different economic cycles.
9. See Appendix C for all
buffer requirements. For the
UK-based banks, we refrain
from calculating the sys-
temic risk buffer ourselves.
Instead, we make the sim-
plifying assumption that
the systemic risk buffer
does not exceed the G-SIB
buffer. Note that this implies
a lower-bound. For all other
banks, systemic
risk buffers are available
(Schoenmaker and
Véron, 2016).
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line) one can see that both hypothetical MREL and
TLAC (both in leverage exposure and risk-weighted
asset terms) are below 8 percent of total assets
for eight out of the 12 banks. Second, the hypo-
thetical MREL exceeds TLAC (which is the higher of
the leverage exposure and risk-weighted asset-
based) in all but one case. In other words, MREL
for G-SIBs seems to be more demanding in terms
of requirements than TLAC, in all but one case.
Third, when looking at TLAC, for nine out of 12 G-
SIBs, the leverage ratio constraint, as opposed to
the risk-weighted constraint, is binding. 
4.3 Discussion
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 show that the choice of the
measure – risk-weighted or total assets, leverage
exposure – is relevant because it might change
how requirements are allocated across banks. In
particular, there is a discernible size bias. How-
ever, the use of risk-weighted assets for capital
ratios is a regulatory preference that we treat as
exogenous here and therefore do not question.
Since according to the EBA RTS, the calculation of
MREL is fundamentally linked to capital require-
ments, the use of risk-weighted assets for MREL
becomes exogenous as well. Nevertheless, to
address the issue of the dominance of risk-
weighted assets in setting the requirements, we
suggest using the leverage ratio as a secondary
metric, instead of only using it as a backstop. This
would imply that the basic leverage ratio require-
ment of 3 percent increases proportionately with
capital requirements, depending on which buffers
are included. This way, total assets, which
strongly correlate with leverage exposure, are
implicitly accounted for.
On the size issue, we think a good way to proceed
is as per the proposal of the Bank of England
(2015), which assigns resolution strategies
according to bank size. Banks above a certain
threshold will be required to hold an MREL con-
sistent with bail in and small banks will be
required to hold an MREL consistent with liquida-
tion, ie a recapitalisation amount of zero. Although
the exact calibration of the threshold is open to
discussion, we strongly support such a simplifi-
cation to both limit the discretion of resolution
authorities and to send clear signals. One such
Regulatory requirements can therefore potentially
change the allocation of resources across banks,
depending on the metric used. The calculation of
risk-weighted assets explains to a great degree
the structural differences between total and risk-
weighted assets. Haldane and Madouros (2012)
find that an internal ratings-based approach, used
by bigger banks, leads to lower risk weights than
the standardised approach, which is mainly used
by smaller banks. The latter allows for less room
for manoeuvre when it comes to the risk weights8. 
4.2  The impact of metric choice on loss
absorption requirements
Turning to the question of alignment of MREL with
TLAC, this only applies to the EU G-SIBs. In this
section, we calculate hypothetical bank-level loss
absorption requirements for G-SIBs, based on the
different definitions of the two measures.
The EBA RTS gives ample discretion to the resolu-
tion authority, and we have therefore to make
some simplifying assumptions. First, we do not
take into consideration any Pillar 2 buffers, as this
reflects the bank’s risk profile, which might be
substantially altered during resolution. Second,
we include the combined buffer, because the EBA
RTS links the assessment of the appropriate cap-
ital position of a bank after resolution, which
determines the recapitalisation amount of MREL,
to the capital position of the peer group, in partic-
ular for G-SIBs. The surviving bank should there-
fore satisfy the capital requirement including the
combined buffer after resolution.
We therefore apply the following requirements to
all G-SIBs: (i) full bail in is the resolution strategy;
(ii) the capital requirement is composed of: 8 per-
cent total capital ratio, 2.5 percent capital conser-
vation buffer, and the higher of G-SIB buffer and
systemic risk buffer9; (iii) we exclude the counter-
cyclical capital buffer since it is time-varying, (iv)
we disregard potential deposit guarantee scheme
and Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
(SREP) adjustments.
Several aspects of Figure 5 are worth highlighting.
First, following the EBA’s proposal and taking the
8 percent of total liabilities as a constraint (red
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signal would be that small banks will always be liq-
uidated, ie resolution authorities will let them fail.
5  COnClUSiOn
As a consequence of the global financial crisis,
various initiatives have been taken in different
jurisdictions to ensure the future resolvability of
banks without massive use of public funds. At the
global level, the Financial Stability Board and the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision agreed
on a global standard for TLAC, which applies only
to the G-SIBs, including European G-SIBs and their
subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. In Europe, the
BRRD introduced the concept of MREL, which is in
the process of being defined. Both TLAC and MREL
seek to ensure that banks have enough loss-
absorption capacity to deal with banking crises,
protecting financial stability and minimising the
costs for taxpayers.
However, there are major differences and there is
potential for confusion. TLAC was conceived as a
Pillar 1 measure and it applies only to G-SIBs, but
it constitutes a common minimum standard; MREL
is a Pillar 2 measure, it applies to all European
banks but it is mostly determined on a case-by-
case basis, with discretion left to the resolution
authority. TLAC provides a clear reference value in
terms of risk-weighted assets or leverage expo-
sure, whereas MREL – while being also based on
these two measures – is currently expected to be
expressed in reference to total assets.
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figure 4: risk-weighted assets and total assets for g-SiBs (in € billions)
Source: Bruegel based on EBA and SNL Financial.
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Source: Bruegel based on EBA and SNL Financial.
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ments for eight out of 12 banks. Comparing our
hypothetical MREL with TLAC requirements, MREL
seems to be more demanding in terms of require-
ments than TLAC, in all but one case. While not dis-
missive of the importance of building appropriate
loss-absorption capacity in those institutions that
pose the greatest systemic risk, we think it is
advisable to end the current regulatory uncer-
tainty. If MREL and TLAC continue not to be
aligned, EU G-SIBs and their international sub-
sidiaries risk facing different requirements in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, and it is hard to see how this
complexity can be helpful in ensuring that these
banks are more easily resolvable in the future. 
A further issue is that of the level of consolidation
at which loss-absorption requirements should be
set. The MREL proposal defines neutrality vis-à-vis
the resolution strategy, while TLAC establishes a
preference for single point of entry models. We
believe that, even though MREL does not explic-
itly require banks to adopt structural measures
that would facilitate a single point of entry
approach, there is a strong rationale for fostering
the application of MREL at the consolidated level.
MREL is meant to create extra loss-absorbing
capacity, ie to shift losses to external sharehold-
ers and bondholders. This seems to imply that
MREL should be applied at the consolidated level,
where there are external share and bond holders,
rather than at the individual internal level.
We showed that the choice of measure is quite rel-
evant and can change the allocation of required
bail-in-able liabilities across banks. If the meas-
ure were based on risk-weighted assets, smaller
banks would face higher loss absorption amounts
for a given requirement, as their risk-weighted to
total assets ratio tends to be higher. However,
since capital requirements are calculated against
risk-weighted assets (and the leverage ratio), and
the EBA RTS link MREL to going-concern capital
requirements, we find it hard to conceive an MREL
that is based on total rather than risk-weighted
assets. One option to implicitly account for total
assets and to limit the dominance of risk-weighted
assets is to increase the leverage ratio require-
ment in proportion to risk-weighted assets instead
of only using it as a static backstop.
Although banks in different size categories might
face similar capital requirements, their MRELs
might differ substantially because resolution
strategies might differ. We argued that the Bank of
England’s (2015) proposal to assign resolution
strategies according to bank size is a good way of
limiting discretion and uncertainty. 
Furthermore, we showed that if MREL and TLAC
were to be aligned for G-SIBs, the hypothetical loss
absorption amount would vary greatly. The 8 per-
cent total liabilities constraint, as proposed by the
EBA, would exceed both MREL and TLAC require-
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APPENDIX A: DATA
Our analysis is based on a dataset of 105 banks from the 2015 EBA transparency exercise, which
covers about 70 percent of the EU’s banking assets as of end-2014 and mid-201510. For 70 out of the
105 banks we use data as of mid-2015, while for the rest except for one we rely on end-2014 data for
reasons of data availability. A large part of these banks are also directly supervised by the Single Super-
visory Mechanism (SSM). To add data on total assets, we match this dataset with data from SNL Finan-
cial based on LEI codes, ie all financials come from EBA, except for total assets. For most banks in the
sample we get assets reported under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and in some
cases under Belgian, Dutch, French, and German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
We make the following changes to the EBA list of institutions: we use financials for Deutsche Pfand-
briefbank AG instead of Hypo Real Estate in line with the updated EBA list as of Jan 2016. We therefore
only rely on SNL data for this entity. For some entities we did not find corresponding LEI codes in the
SNL database. However, we were still able to identify the institutions by comparing their financials
(RWA, CET1, T1) with the ones given by EBA. For some banks with financials in non-EUR denominated
balance sheets the exact figures can differ. We used SNL’s currency converter.
For others, see the list below, we could not find an exact match and replaced them with other banks, usu-
ally the largest subsidiary of the holding with nearly-identical financials):
•  Raiffeisen-Landesbanken-Holding GmbH (529900JP9C734S1LE008) replaced by Raiffeisen Zen-
tralbank Österreich AG;
•  Investar (5493008QOCP58OLEN998) replaced by Argenta Bank- en Verzekeringsgroep;
•  BFA Tenedora De Acciones, S.A. (549300TJUHHEE8YXKI59) replaced by Bankia;
•  Criteria Caixa Holding, S.A. (959800DQQUAMV0K08004) replaced by CaixaBank;
•  Abanca Holding Hispania (95980020140005900000) replaced by ABANCA Corporación Bancaria, SA;
•  Bpifrance (Banque Publique d'Investissement) (969500FYSB4IT3QWYB65) replaced by Bpifrance
Financement SA;
•  For those entities, we use financials as given by SNL instead of EBA.
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APPENDIX B
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figure B.1: leverage exposures to total assets ratio by size group
Source: Bruegel based on EBA Data and SNL Financial. Note: The amounts shown are averages across size groups weighted by total assets.
The size groups are categorised according to total assets: smaller than €30 billion (S), between €30 billion and €150 billion (M), and larger
than €150 billion (L). G-SIBs are excluded from these three groups and deﬁned in FSB (2015). Leverage exposures are missing for: Raiﬀeisen
Zentralbank Österreich, ABANCA Corporación Bancaria, Bpifrance Financement, Argenta Bank- en Verzekeringsgroep.
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figure B.2: risk-weighted assets to total assets ratios for g-SiBs (in € billions)
Source: Bruegel based on EBA Data and SNL Financial.
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figure B.3: risk-weighted assets to leverage exposures ratios for g-SiBs (in € billions)
Source: Bruegel based on EBA Data and SNL Financial.
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APPENDIX C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined buﬀer
Basic requirement
Higher of Systemic risk, 
G-SII and O-SII buﬀers**
Countercyclical capital buﬀer
Capital conservation buﬀer
Tier 2
Additional Tier 1
Common Equity Tier 1
0 – 5 %*
0 – 2.5 %*
2.5 %
2 %
1.5 %
4.5 %
* Assumed upper bounds 
   (values can be higher)
** In certain cases can be the sum 
      of SII and systemic risk buﬀer.
Pillar 2
Bank’s own buﬀer
0 – 2 %*
1 – 2 %*
 
 
 
 
 
Extra cushion of CET1  capital
Extra cushion of CET1  capital 
in boom times
Extra cushion of CET1  capital
for systemically important institutions 
and for macroprudential risk
Bank-speciﬁc additional own funds
 
 
 
figure C.1: Capital requirements
Source: CRD IV/CRR FAQs, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-690_en.htm.
